Ensuring State and Municipal Solvency by unknown
October  2010
Financial Innovations Lab™ Report
ENSURING STATE
AND MUNICIPAL SOLVENCY
Financial Innovations Labs™ bring together 
researchers, policymakers, and business, 
*nancial, and professional practitioners to 
create market-based solutions to business 
and public-policy challenges. Using real and 
simulated case studies, participants consider 
and design alternative capital structures and 
then apply appropriate *nancial technologies 
to them.
+is Financial Innovations Lab™ report was prepared 
by Betsy Zeidman and Rick Palacios Jr. of the Milken 
Institute and Robert E. Litan of the Ewing Marion 
Kau,man Foundation. 
ENSURING STATE
AND MUNICIPAL SOLVENCY
October  2010
Financial Innovations Lab™ Report
We thank those who participated in this Financial Innovations Lab, and in the roundtable on municipal .nance at the 2010 
Milken Institute Global Conference. 0ey made invaluable contributions to the ideas and perspectives summarized in this 
report. 0e Milken Institute especially thanks the Kau1man Foundation for its support of our work and its partnership in 
developing this session. We also wish to acknowledge the signi.cant e1orts of our colleagues at the Milken Institute: Glenn Yago, 
Caitlin MacLean, Jill Scherer, Karen Giles, Lisa Renaud, Jim Barth, and Jennifer Manfrè. We’d also like to thank Wendy Guillies, 
Barbara Pruitt, and Harold Bradley of the Kau1man Foundation.
Acknowledgments
About the Milken Institute
0e Milken Institute is an independent economic think tank whose mission is to improve the lives and economic conditions 
of diverse populations in the United States and around the world by helping business and public policy leaders identify and 
implement innovative ideas for creating broad-based prosperity. We put research to work with the goal of revitalizing regions 
and .nding new ways to generate capital for people with original ideas
We focus on:
human capital: the talent, knowledge, and experience of people, and their value to organizations, economies, and society;
!nancial capital: innovations that allocate .nancial resources e2ciently, especially to those who ordinarily would not 
have access to them, but who can best use them to build companies, create jobs, accelerate life-saving medical research, 
and solve long-standing social and economic problems; and
social capital: the bonds of society that underlie economic advancement, including schools, health care, cultural 
institutions, and government services
By creating ways to spread the bene.ts of human, .nancial, and social capital to as many people as possible— 
by democratizing capital—we hope to contribute to prosperity and freedom in all corners of the globe.
We are nonpro.t, nonpartisan, and publicly supported.
About the Kauffman Foundation 
0e Ewing Marion Kau1man Foundation is a private nonpartisan foundation that works to harness the power of entrepreneur-
ship and innovation to grow economies and improve human welfare. 0rough its research and other initiatives, the Kau1man 
Foundation aims to open young people’s eyes to the possibility of entrepreneurship, promote entrepreneurship education, raise 
awareness of entrepreneurship-friendly policies, and .nd alternative pathways for the commercialization of new knowledge 
and technologies. In addition, the Foundation focuses on initiatives in the Kansas City region to advance students’ math and 
science skills, and improve the educational achievement of urban students, including the Ewing Marion Kau1man School, 
a college preparatory charter school for middle and high school students set to open in 2011. Founded by late entrepreneur 
and philanthropist Ewing Marion Kau1man, the Foundation is based in Kansas City, Mo. and has approximately $2 billion in 
assets. For more information, visitwww.kau"man.org, and follow the Foundation on www.twitter.com/kau"manfdn and 
www.facebook.com/kau"manfdn.
© 2010 Milken Institute
Introduction  .....................................................................................................5
0 e Scope of the Problem ..............................................................................................6
Snapshot of the U.S. Municipal Bond Market  ..................................................................11
Part 1: Overview of Financial Innovations Lab Findings ..............13
Part 2: Ideas for Alleviating Current Budget Issues 
and Preventing Future Crises ....................................................................15
Solutions for Restructuring Municipal Expenditures  .....................................................15
Bridging Pension Plan Funding Gaps ......................................................................15
Containing the Rising Cost of Government Operations ............................................16
Understanding Chapter 9 Bankruptcy  ......................................................................18
Sharing the Burden: A Fresh-Start Solution to the Expenditure Dilemma? .................20
Solutions for Generating Additional, Sustainable Municipal Revenue  .............................21
Suggestions for Municipal Process Reform  ...................................................................22
Suggestions for Federal/State Partnerships.....................................................................24
Conclusion .........................................................................................................27
Appendix: Financial Innovations Lab Participants............................28
Endnotes..............................................................................................................29
Table of Contents
The sooner governments address their long-term structural challenges, 
the better o! they and their residents will be.
5Introduction
As the recession drags on, states and municipalities .nd themselves in a deep hole. For the .rst time since the 
Great Depression, income, sales and property taxes have declined in unison.1 0e cyclical challenges are clear: 
falling tax receipts, high unemployment, tepid investment returns, and overall economic uncertainty. 
But even more daunting are the long-term structural issues that are simultaneously coming to a head: trillions of 
dollars in unfunded pension obligations, the escalating costs of other post-employment bene.ts (OPEB), record 
numbers of retirees poised to tap pensions and bene.ts, increasing longevity, and signi.cant revenue/expenditure 
mismatches.
Against this urgent backdrop, the Milken Institute and the Kau1man Foundation hosted a Financial Innovations 
Lab in July 2010. Unlike any previous meeting addressing current conditions in state and municipal .nance, the 
Lab brought together a diverse group of state and local o2cials, union representatives, experts from the capital 
markets, money managers, academics, public-sector attorneys, and representatives from bond rating agencies.2 
Together they explored both immediate .xes and broader strategies that could help prevent future crises. 
It’s clear that achieving long-term solvency for states and municipalities will require painful paradigm shi3s. 
0ere is no simple approach that will work for all 91,000 local governmental units in the U.S.3 But the sooner 
governments address their long-term structural challenges, the better o1 they and their residents will be. 0e 
short-term expediency of simply laying o1 workers to meet hard budget constraints is not sustainable in the long 
run and will deprive citizens of services (safety, sanitation, education) they want and deserve. 0e Lab produced 
some noteworthy options, including:
! adopting standardized actuarial assumptions, perhaps similar to corporate-sector accounting standards  
! implementing multi-year budgeting plans/rainy-day funds 
! reassessing possible economies of scale from shared services/consolidation
! bringing together all the key stakeholders—government workers and the unions that represent them, 
bondholders, and citizen-taxpayers—in jurisdictions facing the most immediate problems to .nd ways 
of sharing the burden of .scal adjustment to ensure long-run solvency
! establishing control boards as a last resort for states and municipalities in extreme distress
! possibly providing short-term federal aid to states and municipalities that actively implement steps to 
restructure their .nances  
0e Lab sparked a critical conversation, and this report summarizes the information and perspectives shared 
during the day’s proceedings.
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The Scope Of The Problem
0 e Great Recession has driven the national unemployment rate sharply higher, from 5.0 percent in December 
2007 to 9.6 percent in August 2010.4 Many parts of the country are in even worse shape, with several states now 
posting double-digit jobless rates.5 Bleak job prospects have caused households to focus on reducing debt and 
scaling back consumption, a trend that has caused a drop in sales and income tax receipts. In addition, the states 
with the highest unemployment levels have also su1 ered disproportionately from the bursting of the housing 
bubble (see . gure 1), leading to a drop in property values and related tax receipts. As sales and property taxes 
represent the largest portions of state and local tax revenue (see . gure 2), the fall in revenues has been sharper 
and longer in duration than in past recessions (see . gure 3). 
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States hardest hit by the housing bubble and facing high unemployment
Individual income 
20% 
All other 
20% 
General sales & 
 gross receipts 
22% 
Property 
38% 
$249 billion 
$258 billion $282 billion 
$476 billion 
- Tobacco & alcohol 
- Motor vehicle &  
  operator’s licenses 
- Motor fuel sales 
- Corporation net income 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
2
FIGURE
Sources of U.S. state and local revenue by type of tax
2009 aggregate
7Introduction
In . scal year 2010, 48 states faced shortfalls—a record gap of $192 billion, or 29 percent of total state budgets.6 But 
while the federal government can run perpetual de. cits, that’s not the case at the state level. With the exception of 
Vermont, all states have some type of annual or biennial balanced-budget law. As a result, during times of economic 
distress, states with budget gaps are forced to cut spending, increase taxes, or . nd other sources of revenue. 
Figure 4 shows the results of a June 2010 survey by the National Association of State Budget O2  cers reporting a 
variety of approaches to addressing these gaps. Targeted and across-the-board spending cuts and layo1 s led the list, 
with furloughs and reductions in local aid close behind.7 A few states introduced or increased fees, such as user fees 
(15), court fees (14), or fees related to transportation (11), higher education (10) and business (9). But with current 
debt levels and ongoing economic uncertainty, the political reality is that raising taxes is generally a non-starter.
-15% 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
Year over year % change 
Year 
Jul. 1990 - Mar. 1991 
         recession 
Mar. 2001 - Nov. 2001
recession  Dec. 2007 - Jun. 2009
Great Recession
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (Q2-2010).
3
FIGURE
Total state and local tax revenue
Strategy # of states that used strategy Strategy
# of states that 
used strategy
Targeted cuts 36 Salary reductions 12
Across-the-board cuts 28 Transportation-related fees 11
Layo1 s 26 Higher education-related fees 10
Furloughs 22 Business-related fees 9
Reduction of local aid 22 Cuts to state employee bene. ts 9
Tapped rainy day fund 19 Early retirement 6
User fees 15 Privatization 3
Court-related fees 14 Gaming/gambling expansion 3
Reorganization of agencies 14 Lottery expansion 2
Sources: National Governors Association, National Association of State Budget O2  cers (June 2010).
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FIGURE
How have states responded so far?
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One expenditure that is di2  cult, and in some cases impossible, to adjust is the allocation to pensions. Public-sector 
retirement bene. ts are constitutionally protected in most states, with case law setting precedent.8 0 is inability to 
modify plans creates a serious structural dilemma. Many states’ pension contributions have grown dramatically 
as a share of a general fund revenues (see Illinois, for example, in . gure 5). At the aggregate level, state and local 
government pensions su1 ered losses of $835 billion during the height of the . nancial meltdown (see . gure 6); 
through the . rst quarter of 2010, less than 50 percent of those losses had been recouped. 
Furthermore, the accounting standards that determine public-sector pension liabilities are opaque when compared 
to those that apply in the private sector. In fact, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) recently 
released a statement highlighting several public-sector accounting issues as potential targets for reform.9 For 
example, as opposed to the private-sector’s market value approach, most states use an actuarial smoothing period 
of . ve years,10 with states such as Arizona smoothing returns over ten years.11 Because of this approach, public 
pension funding levels over the next several years will continue to re; ect the gains and losses of 2008–2009.12 In 
addition, public-sector pension liabilities are currently discounted at unrealistic rates of return, which can lead to 
an understating of liabilities and subsequent overstating of pension funding ratios. 
To make matters worse, many states and municipalities authorized increases in retirement bene. ts during good 
times when solid investment returns were the norm. Yet they failed to adequately set aside funds to keep these 
promises if conditions changed.13 More than half of states had fully funded pension systems in FY2000, but only 
four (Florida, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin) could make a similar claim in FY2008.14   
Beyond their pension obligations, state and local governments are confronting growing health-care costs. Medicare 
is the largest health-related budget item, and the share of total operating revenues allocated to retirees’ health 
bene. ts is projected to more than double by 2050 (see . gure 7).   
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FIGURE Health and non-health expenditures of state and local governments, 
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FIGURE
Total holdings and investments of state and local government employee retirement systems
Alarmingly, it was not until FY 2008 that states and municipalities with annual revenue exceeding $100 million 
were even required to report liabilities for other post-employment bene. ts (OPEB). Historically, the public 
sector funded these bene. ts on a pay-as-you-go basis (i.e., in retirement as opposed to the accrual years of actual 
employment), and thus the majority of OPEB liabilities are unfunded. A 2009 U.S. Government Accountability 
O2  ce (GAO) research brief found that in aggregate, all 50 states and the 39 largest local governments had set 
aside less than 5 percent of their reported $559 billion total OPEB liabilities.15 Moreover, OPEB liabilities are not 
calculated with a uniform methodology. Actuarial assumptions such as the discount rate and rate of in; ation for 
health-care costs can have a dramatic in; uence on total reported liabilities. 
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Given these conditions, the municipal bond market—a critical source of funding—has come under pressure. 
In recent years, municipal bond downgrades have risen sharply (see . gure 8). General obligation (GO) bonds in 
California, Illinois, Arizona, and Michigan have all experienced downgrades since 2007.16 Lower bond ratings 
can increase borrowing costs for states, as bond investors require additional yield to compensate for increases in 
perceived investment risk. 0 is increase is re; ected in credit default swap (CDS) contracts on state GO debt, which 
are now trading at levels comparable to European sovereigns (see . gure 9). And while demand for municipal debt 
has remained steady (through August 2010, year-to-date issuance was up 1.4 percent on a year-over-year basis to 
$262.5 billion17), it could prove more di2  cult to . nd willing buyers if defaults do occur. 
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FIGURE
Annual cost of insuring $10 million in debt against default
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FIGURE
Quarterly municipal rating revisions
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Snapshot of the U.S. Municipal Bond Market 
0 e U.S. municipal bond market has existed for roughly 200 years, serving as a source of . nancing for early-
19th-century infrastructure projects such as the Erie Canal (see . gure 10). Over the last 58 years, the U.S. 
municipal bond market has blossomed from $25 billion to its current level of $2.84 trillion (see . gure 11). 
Of the $2.84 trillion in outstanding municipal debt, the largest holders are households (36 percent), mutual 
funds (34 percent), and insurance companies (16 percent).18 Roughly 90 percent of total U.S. issuance in 2009 
went to general purpose use ($128 billion), education ($92 billion), transportation ($49 billion), health care 
($46 billion), and utilities ($40 billion).19 
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FIGURE
Holders of U.S. municipal securities
Source: Milken Institute.
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FIGURE
200 years of municipal ! nance
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Overview of Financial Innovations Lab Findings
PART 1
In July 2010, as the Financial Innovations Lab was convened, the national media was beginning to take note of the 
worrisome condition of state and local government .nances, focusing in particular on pensions. 0e Lab’s agenda 
covered this and other challenges, and considered both short-term and long-term remedies. 
0e balance of this report summarizes the discussion that took place, with four categories of recommendations: 
1) solutions for municipal expenditure restructuring; 2) solutions for generating additional, sustainable municipal 
revenue; 3) suggestions for municipal process reform; and 4) suggestions for federal/state partnerships with 
conditions attached. 
Solutions for municipal expenditure restructuring include such concepts as:
! achieving economies of scale by sharing and consolidating basic services 
! introducing managed competition where applicable20  
! phasing in de.ned-contribution (DC) or hybrid cash balance retirement plans in lieu of traditional 
de.ned-bene.t (DB) pension plans
! eliminating pension spiking21
! reducing costs associated with correctional facilities
! using preemptive collective burden sharing among all key parties—bondholders, union representatives, 
public-sector employees, and taxpayers—to avoid Chapter 9
Solutions for generating additional, sustainable municipal revenue include:
! broadening the tax base to capture generally under-taxed areas of the economy such as services
! allowing more municipalities to have access to the income tax
! restructuring the property tax
With respect to suggestions for municipal process reform, Lab participants proposed:
! implementing multi-year budgeting
! revising public-sector compensation incentives to focus less on deferred compensation and more on 
active employment rewards/bene.ts 
! mandating adequate rainy-day reserve fund contributions in periods of economic expansion that can be 
tapped during downturns 
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! for situations that require it, launching discussions among the key stakeholders in each jurisdiction over 
how to share the needed . scal adjustments (formal bankruptcy as a “solution” for municipalities was 
recognized to be a lot more complex than it may appear, and in any event, is unavailable for states)
! revisiting the idea of . nancial control boards or oversight authorities
! increasing the transparency of public-sector actuarial assumptions, (e.g., discount rate method; 
smoothing period; longevity and retirement pattern assumptions; maturity of workforce; future value 
disclosures; and asset structure/volatility) 
! requiring long-term maintenance fund reserves for large-scale infrastructure projects
Suggestions for federal/state partnerships proposed tying federal dollars to budget restructuring covenants 
(e.g., more realistic public pension rate-of-return assumptions; elimination of pension spiking; uniform pension 
bene. t contracts for future employees; and revenue e1 orts on behalf of taxpayers). Models that could leverage 
such a covenant scheme include:
! a “race-to-solvency” initiative   
! having the federal government act 
as a buyer of pension obligation 
bonds (POBs) 
! using federal money to bridge public 
pension liability gaps that result from 
downward adjustments to actuarial 
rate-of-return assumptions
Glenn Yago (le! ) and Betsy Zeidman of the Milken Institute listen 
as Robert Litan of the Kau" man Foundation frames the issue for 
attendees. 
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PART 2
Solutions for Restructuring Municipal Expenditures 
Service cuts so far have been the most common approach to closing state and local municipal budget gaps. 
0 e National League of Cities predicts local government workforce reductions of nearly 500,000 in the current 
and upcoming . scal years. 0 ese job losses will sap the strength of the recovery and conceivably, in a worst-case 
scenario, cause a setback.22 
Recognizing the impact of such cuts on the quality of life for residents and businesses, Lab participants reached 
beyond short-term . xes and aimed to identify sustainable ways to restructure spending patterns and long-term 
liabilities. Solutions addressed both the funding crisis in many employee DB pension plans and the broader issues 
of government operations.
Bridging Pension Plan Funding Gaps
Elected o2  cials, pension fund . duciaries, and representatives from public employee labor unions all participated 
in the Lab discussions. While there was vigorous debate on the source of the problem (i.e., the size of the contracts 
vs. management of the plans), participants generally agreed that a DB plan could be a good model when properly 
managed. Pensions can have a signi. cant and bene. cial impact on the broader economy as well: Each dollar paid 
out in state and local pension bene. ts supports $2.36 in total economic output, and for every dollar contributed by 
taxpayers to state and local pension funds, $11.45 in total output is supported in the national economy.23    
While some states have maintained their funding levels (including Florida, which was represented at the Lab), 
most are in serious trouble and will have to undergo restructuring going forward. An expert noted that even for 
the City of New York, which has been responsibly paying its annual required contribution (ARC), the current path 
is not sustainable or a1 ordable; the city’s contribution has increased by $6.5 billion in 10 years. 
Possible ways to tackle these challenges include:
! Phase in DC or hybrid retirement models in lieu of traditional DB plans
Given the legal challenges inherent in revisiting contractual pension commitments, several Lab 
participants suggested phasing in DC or hybrid cash balance plans for all new employees. For example, 
existing workers’ DB plans could be frozen and replaced with DC plans going forward, if laws permit. 
Alternatively, plans could adopt mandatory DC layers on top of conservative DB base plans. A tiered 
system could incorporate certain variables (such as date of hire, retirement age cuto1 s, cost-of-living 
estimates, and vesting periods) into the pension entitlement equation, allowing for a long-term 
stabilization of retirement liabilities. 
Ideas for Alleviating Current Budget Issues 
& Preventing Future Crises
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! Eliminate pension spiking
0 e practice of adding accrued sick, vacation, and other pay categories to a public-sector employee’s 
. nal-year salary to determine pension payments should be eliminated. 
! Allow private-sector employees to participate in public pension system
In addition to absorbing the 50 percent of working individuals who currently do not have access to an 
employer-based retirement plan, allowing private-sector employees to participate in public pension 
plans would provide a much-needed capital boost to troubled state retirement plans. New participants 
would also bene. t from greater access to a professionally managed, highly diversi. ed investment pool in 
addition to reduced investment fees and . nancial literacy programs.24 Additionally, this solution could 
help address the broader societal challenge of large numbers of private-sector workers without adequate 
retirement savings.     
Beyond the Lab suggestions, other ideas for pension plan funding resolution include increasing public-sector 
employee contribution rates, as well as placing limits on total retirement bene. t packages.
Containing the Rising Costs of Government Operations 
Governments at all levels are exploring ways to reduce their 
operational costs; there is a renewed focus on streamlining 
organizational structures and processes. One approach is managed 
competition, which is the process of allowing both public and private 
entities to compete for contracts. First implemented in Phoenix 
during the 1970s, managed competition has proven successful in 
areas such as public transportation, document management, human 
resources management, . nes/accounts collections, refuse collection, 
park management/maintenance, and catering.25 Moreover, research 
has shown that when properly implemented, managed competition 
can produce annual savings between 10 and 30 percent of costs.26 
Additional solutions for improved governmental operations that were 
discussed during the Lab include the following:
! Reduce fragmentation and improve productivity/e#  ciency within municipal governance
As previously noted, there are more than 91,000 local governmental units within the U.S.27 O3 en 
services are duplicated at the city and county level, or in small municipalities that are adjacent to one 
another. One participant noted that Pennsylvania is divided into more than 2,500 local jurisdictions. 
But other states have been able to adopt a more centralized delivery of services, resulting in lower 
tax requirements. California’s joint powers authority (JPA), which allows local units to share various 
functions in addition to issuing bonds, was cited as a possible model for eliminating fragmentation. 
Lab participants argued that shared services and consolidation could be brought to bear on pension 
plans. Pennsylvania, for example, currently has more than 3,100 local government pension plans, with 
Valerie Chang represented the MacArthur 
Foundation during the daylong workshop.
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an average of 12 employees, $10 million in assets, and an annual cost of roughly $2,000 per employee. 
E2  ciency improvements could also be applied in education, concentrating on back-o2  ce functions and 
possibly district consolidation. 
However, it was also noted that shared service arrangements are o3 en di2  cult or impermissible under 
collective bargaining agreements. In addition, consolidation shouldn’t be viewed as a panacea; the cost 
savings associated with consolidation can vary widely by school district size.28 
! Reduce costs associated with correctional facilities
0 e corrections industry represents a growing portion of state budgets, second only to Medicaid over 
the past two decades, and exceeding $50 billion annually.29 It costs on average roughly $50,000 per 
year to incarcerate a prisoner in California. Restructuring corrections expenditures o1 er states an 
opportunity to reduce costs via lasting policy initiatives. 
Possible options include: 1) review and reform sentencing guidelines; 2) improve and expand prisoner 
re-entry programs to reduce recidivism rates; 3) initiate enhanced community parole and probation 
oversight; and 4) modify release conditions for lower-risk geriatric and chronically ill inmates who 
require costly health care while in prison.30 
Other cost-reduction strategies for state and local governments include:31
` Streamline current sta#  ng models and logistics channels
` Create objective oversight committees to conduct cost-bene! t analysis for partnering 
and privatization of public-sector services
` Re-evaluate demand for services and remove underutilized programs
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Understanding Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Municipal Chapter 9 . lings have been quite rare over the last three decades (see . gure 12). Moreover, since 
1970, Moody’s-rated municipal issuers have experienced only 54 defaults.32
While an investor’s ultimate fear is that of a municipal bankruptcy, the legal right to actually declare 
Chapter 9 is not clear-cut. No state can declare bankruptcy, and each state’s law dictates whether its local 
municipalities are able to . le Chapter 9. Municipal . lings are speci. cally authorized in only 16 states; 
conditionally authorized in seven states; granted with limited authorization in three states; and prohibited 
in two states.33 
0 e formalities involved in . ling Chapter 9 represent a formidable gauntlet. In order to qualify for a Chapter 
9 . ling, the municipality in question must pass the following eligibility requirements: 1) bankruptcy must be 
speci. cally authorized by state law; 2) the debtor must satisfy the insolvency test, which is a fact-intensive 
determination, based on an inability to pay debts as they become due; 3) the debtor must genuinely seek to 
e1 ect a plan that will satisfy creditors, not just buy time or frustrate creditors; 4) the debtor must have . rst 
tried to avoid . ling for bankruptcy by negotiating with creditors, unless impractical.34
On top of the legal complexities associated with entering Chapter 9 status, implementing bondholder 
restructuring agreements during the bankruptcy case can be demanding. Not all municipal bonds are treated 
equally in these cases. 
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As long as dedicated revenue streams remain intact, special revenue bonds (i.e., bonds with exclusive 
recourse to the revenues generated by a speci. c project or program) maintain quasi-immunity with regards 
to restructuring—and revenue bonds have accounted for roughly two-thirds of average annual municipal 
issuance over the last decade (see . gure 13). Even among GO bonds (bonds with recourse to the general 
taxing power of the issuer), there are subcategories (such as those that are secured with tax liens) that may 
also be largely insulated from intensive restructuring. 
Moreover, given the dependence of many municipalities on the capital markets, mustering the political will 
to restructure bond debt can be daunting, especially if the capital markets are viewed as a possible source of 
funding to emerge from Chapter 9.
Additionally, any Chapter 9 plan of adjustment for debt restructuring generally requires a two-thirds 
approval from creditors.35 With 36 percent of outstanding municipal debt held directly by individual 
investors and another 34 percent held indirectly through mutual funds, the task of achieving two-thirds 
approval could be prohibitive.36 Similar voting thresholds would apply to the holders of pension- and OPEB-
related claims that would be adjusted under a plan (public employees and retirees). Although there are 
alternatives to obtaining the necessary blessing from creditors, these also may pose obstacles to a smooth 
restructuring.
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Sharing the Burden: A Fresh-Start Solution to the Expenditure Dilemma? 
As they struggle to cope with daunting revenue/expenditure mismatches as well as massive long-term pension and 
OPEB liabilities, will municipalities utilize bankruptcy as a strategic option moving forward? A proposal was raised 
to “prepackage” Chapter 9 (that is, by formulating a “plan of adjustment” and soliciting the agreement of creditors 
prior to commencing a Chapter 9 case), using an approach similar to the one employed in the recent (and apparently 
successful) turnaround of General Motors. 
However, municipal . nance experts noted that a Chapter 9 . ling is not an option for states, and is typically not 
the best solution for municipalities (see sidebar). It is a lengthy, expensive and complex process with long-lasting 
repercussions. A3 er Vallejo, Calif., . led for bankruptcy in 2008, its mere eligibility to be a debtor under Chapter 9 
was contested for roughly a year prior to a . nal decision permitting the city to proceed with its case. 
Several attendees also pointed out that if a streamlined Chapter 9 process were institutionalized, borrowing costs 
for all municipalities would undoubtedly rise, with investors demanding higher returns to compensate for an 
increase in the probability of bond defaults.  Others observed that Chapter 9 was not a panacea for restructuring 
pension and OPEB liabilities since a municipality would still need to . nd a way to cover the liabilities (albeit 
potentially a reduced amount, over time.) On the other hand, in certain emergency situations or following the 
exhaustion of other alternatives, Chapter 9 does provide the tools to address ballooning pension and OPEB 
liabilities. Shaky . scal conditions are likely to push many municipalities closer to bankruptcy.  
Lab participants explored an alternative to this clearly undesirable option:  Preemptive and collective burden sharing, 
a process by which all key stakeholders (bondholders, union representatives, public-sector employees, and taxpayers) 
would share a . nancial hit in order to assure the long-term sustainability of the municipal entity. Public-sector 
employees could be grouped into age-speci. c pension arrangements, with younger and more recent hires expected 
to make larger contributions to their retirement and health-care plans, thus driving down long-term liabilities. With 
respect to bondholders, various approaches to debt restructuring could be implemented (e.g., extending maturity 
dates and reducing current interest payment arrangements, among other possible treatment options).  
A crisis drove New York City to adopt this arrangement 
during its 1975 . scal meltdown. Faced with an over-whelming 
operating de. cit, billions in outstanding short-term debt, and 
shut out from the credit markets, the City had in e1 ect run out 
of money and could no longer fund its day-to-day operations. 
As a solution, state as well as federal intervention avoided a 
default and subsequent bankruptcy. 0 e Municipal Assistance 
Corporation (MAC), an independent corporation/entity of the 
state, was authorized to sell bonds to meet the borrowing needs 
of the City. 0 e MAC demanded various forms of burden-
sharing, including bond modi. cations, multi-tiered pension 
enactment, union wage deferrals, tuition increases, a 30% 
increase in transit fares, and across-the-board tax increases.37 
Henry Kevane, an attorney with Pachulski Stang 
Ziehl & Jones, explained why Chapter 9 # lings are 
not the simple solution many people assume.
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Whether a burden-sharing agreement such as New York’s 1975 MAC could be reached in today’s fractured 
political climate was debatable (although if . nancial conditions of particular jurisdictions worsen, some sort of 
burden-sharing should become more politically acceptable, and indeed necessary). In essence, since a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy is generally considered an undesirable and onerous last resort (see sidebar), shared . nancial sacri. ce 
can perhaps be a less painful, more strategic option for municipalities and other parties with vested interests.
Solutions For Generating Additional, 
Sustainable Municipal Revenue 
Revenue-side solutions to bolster public-sector co1 ers included:
! Broaden the Tax Base
During the Lab, Mike Pagano of the University of Illinois at Chicago pointed out that only 11 percent of all 
municipalities have the authority to levy income or payroll taxes, while 55 percent have access to the sales tax. 
Michael Mazerov from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities cited  research demonstrating the possible 
bene. ts associated with expanding the taxation of services (see . gure 14). Given the evolution of the U.S. 
from a manufacturing to service-based economy, Mazerov noted that levying sales taxes on services could 
make state tax systems fairer, more stable, more economically neutral, and easier to administer.38 But it 
was pointed out that states with relatively high taxes such as New Jersey have not necessarily fared better 
during the recent economic downturn. Moreover, cities that rely heavily on the top-tier income bracket for 
tax revenue need to be cautious of mobile wealth. For example, facing an onslaught of tax increases, New 
Jersey experienced a net out; ow of roughly $70 billion in wealth from 2004 through 2008.39 Overall, Lab 
participants felt that increasing taxes would obviously be a challenge in the face of current economic and 
political realities.
! Restructure the property tax 
While property taxes represent more than a third of aggregate U.S. state and local municipal revenues, 
they have historically lagged the overall business cycle.40 Because of the challenge presented by this delayed 
revenue, Lab participants proposed ideas to improve upon the existing property tax structure. Pagano 
advocated moving away from a general property tax toward a split-rate tax structure in which the value 
of land and the value of structures/improvements on the land are taxed at di1 erent rates. Participants also 
explored reconsidering the tax-exempt status of educational and medical institutions.
! Make the cost of public services more transparent to validate revenue needs
One gray area within public-sector . nances is that of service cost metrics. Convincing Americans that they 
have to pay for the services they want is critical to enacting sustainable revenue-side solutions. Providing 
greater transparency with regard to the actual costs of state and city-level services may help taxpayers better 
understand, value, and prioritize revenue generators that facilitate their quality of life.
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Suggestions for Municipal Process Reform 
In order for states and local municipalities to move beyond the current crisis, structural process reforms need to 
be implemented, especially with regard to transparency and sustainability. 0 e following solutions were proposed 
during the Lab.
! Re-think public-sector employee incentive schemes
Currently, the public sector’s employee incentive scheme is skewed towards deferred compensation. In order 
to reduce the long-term liabilities associated with this arrangement, Lab participants suggested that states and 
local municipalities revise compensation structures. 0 is system would place more emphasis on rewarding and 
incentivizing public-sector employees during their working life rather than creating motivations for retirement.
! Standardize actuarial assumptions and increase their transparency
Public-sector actuaries calculate the actuarial required contribution (ARC) as the amount that must be set 
aside annually to fund the present value of future bene. ts accrued in the current year, plus the amortized cost 
of any unfunded liabilities. A municipality’s actual contribution is subsequently compared with the ARC to 
assess whether funding is su2  cient. 
But state and city o2  cials (and some actuaries themselves) note that it’s hard to understand or determine 
how long-term liabilities are quanti. ed. Consequently, funding levels cannot be compared across plans, and 
the credibility of a speci. c ARC is o3 en suspect. Lab participants recommended making public accounting 
assumptions fully transparent and/or coming up with standardized assumptions that are similar to the process 
used in corporate accounting. Assumptions of concern included: 1) discount rate method; 2) smoothing 
period; 3) longevity assumptions; 4) retirement pattern assumptions; 5) maturity of workforce; 6) future value 
disclosures; 7) asset structure/volatility.
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! Revisit the idea of ! nancial control boards and oversight authorities 
Financial control boards and oversight authorities can provide a method of layered . scal oversight. 0 e prime 
historical example remains the New York State Financial Control Board, formed in 1975 to deal with New 
York City’s . scal crisis. Aside from reviewing the city’s annual rolling four-year . nancial plan, the Control 
Board maintains the power to re-impose a control period if various covenants are broken (e.g., required debt 
service payments and de. cit thresholds).41 
Other states such as North Carolina, Vermont, and Pennsylvania possess similar oversight mechanisms. During 
the Great Depression, North Carolina’s Local Government Commission (LGC) was created to address problems 
in local government . nance. In its modern-day form, the LCG operates as a division within the Department 
of the State Treasurer, maintaining oversight and approval responsibilities for all local government . nance 
in addition to managing state and local debt issuance and interfacing with bond rating agencies.42 Vermont’s 
Capital Debt A1 ordability Advisory Committee (CDAAC) is responsible for conducting an annual review of 
the state’s tax-supported GO debt and submitting to the governor and General Assembly an estimate of the 
maximum amount of new long-term GO debt that should be authorized for the next . scal year.43 While the 
CDAAC’s estimate is advisory, it has historically been adopted by the state as a bonding limit.44 
Furthermore, Lab participants suggested the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority (PICA) 
as a potential model for layered . scal oversight. Created in 1991 to provide . nancial assistance to Philadelphia, 
PICA still exercises advisory and review powers over Philadelphia’s . nancial a1 airs, including the power to 
review and approve . ve-year . nancial plans prepared at least annually by the city.45 Pennsylvania possesses an 
additional layer of . scal supervision for all of its local municipalities in the form of the 1987 Financial Distressed 
Municipalities Act, also known as Act 47. Under this law, distressed municipalities are overseen by the state’s 
Economic Development Corporation and relinquish all budgetary decision-making authority.46 
With speci. c regard to pensions, a Public Pension 
Funding Authority (PPFA) was discussed as one 
possible oversight mechanism. In theory, the PPFA 
would serve as an objective yet binding fact-. nding 
authority to determine the critical steps required for 
funding or restructuring unfunded pensions, with the 
power to use its determinations as the basis for a pre-
packaged plan of debt adjustment.47
! Require infrastructure project 
maintenance reserves
In order for states and municipalities to better prepare 
for the long-term costs associated with infrastructure 
projects, Lab participants suggested that maintenance 
reserve funds be set aside prior to any voter-approved 
Mike Musuraca, a former union o$  cial who is 
now a private equity investor with Blue Wolf 
Capital Partners, shares his ideas.
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infrastructure project, as is already the case in states such as Utah and Missouri. Build America Bonds have been 
widely used since their introduction in 2009; it was suggested that issuers be required to submit a maintenance 
cost plan for the estimated duration of a project’s lifespan in order to receive the 35 percent federal subsidy. 
! Mandate use of emergency stabilization/rainy-day funds
0 e current funding situation came about because states and municipalities did not set aside adequate rainy-
day reserve funds that could be tapped in the event of an economic downturn. A3 er reaching 11.5 percent of 
aggregate state general fund expenditures in FY2006, rainy-day balances are expected to drop to just 5.8 percent 
in FY2011.48 Lab participants suggested implementing a mechanism similar to that of Massachusetts, which 
deposits 0.5 percent of the total revenues from taxes in the preceding . scal year into a stabilization fund.49 
Mandated rainy-day fund contributions would help address budget dilemmas going forward.
! Implement multi-year budgeting
Forty-four states practiced biennial budgeting in 1940, yet just 20 do so in 2010. Of these, only Oregon, 
North Dakota, and Wyoming undertake true biennial budgeting (i.e., the passing of a consolidated two-
year budget).50 Lab participants unanimously agreed that multi-year budget planning, as opposed to annual 
budgets, would bene. t states. In theory, multi-year budgets would force policymakers to assess revenue/
expenditure stability or lack thereof over the long run, deterring one-o1 , unsustainable expenditure increases. 
Suggestions For Federal/State Partnerships
As evidenced by the recent congressional . ght over increased support to the states, there is neither public appetite 
nor federal budgetary largesse for assistance. However, there are some approaches to delivering federal assistance 
that could create incentives for greater . scal responsibility. For example, federal dollars can be tied to state and 
municipal budget restructuring covenants, similar to that of an International Monetary Fund or World Bank 
assistance model. Additionally, collateral could be pledged. 
0 e following is a short list of public-sector covenants proposed at the Lab:
! Adopt standardized actuarial assumptions similar to corporate-sector accounting standards, 
(e.g., no smoothing and more realistic rate-of-return assumptions)
! Phase in a uniform pension bene. t contract for incoming employees
! Bene. t packages are rolled back to more realistic and sustainable levels
! Pension packages cannot exceed 100 percent of pre-existing salary 
! All pension spiking provisions are eliminated, with minimum basis for retirement earnings being the last . ve 
years of employment
! Adequate revenue e1 ort on behalf of taxpayers
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Models that could leverage a covenant scheme include:
! Set up a “Race to Solvency”
Several Lab participants suggested using federal money to motivate states to get through emergency budget 
shortfalls and . scal crises. In order to qualify for federal dollars, states would have to develop budgetary 
plans that demonstrated long-term . scal stability. 0 is initiative could be modeled on the Department 
of Education’s “Race to the Top,” which fostered competition among the states and tied funding to the 
establishment of speci. c criteria. 
! Bridge the liability gap to enable more realistic rate-of-return assumptions
In calculating long-term liabilities, states currently use rate-of-return assumptions ranging from 7.25 percent 
to 8.5 percent (see . gure 15). If states switch to a lower discount rate, the present value of their liabilities 
would rise signi. cantly. Lab participants suggested having the federal government bridge the funding gap that 
would result from lowering rate-of-return assumptions to more realistic and sustainable levels. Rather than a 
steep and hasty one-time reduction, discount rates could be lowered gradually over several years, with various 
covenants attached to all federal funding used to bridge the discount assumption gap. 
! Treasury becomes buyer of POBs
Pension obligation bonds (POBs) have been issued for more than 25 years by states and local governments 
to cover pension fund obligations, with California and Illinois accounting for the largest share of activity.51 
While the federal government does not typically participate in POB o1 erings, it was suggested that in . scal 
crises, this policy could be reversed. Accordingly, the federal government could purchase state and city POBs 
at favorable rates, thus acting as a quasi-subsidy for issuers. To better align incentives, the participation rate or 
exposure of the federal government would be linked to the Lab’s proposed covenants. In essence, POB issuers 
would be ranked, with those in dire conditions forced to abide by the most restrictive covenants prior to 
federal participation. As an example, in 2008, the state of Connecticut issued a POB to fund $2 billion of the 
unfunded liability in its Teachers’ Retirement Fund, with a covenant attached requiring the state to fully fund 
its annual actuarially recommended contribution to the Teachers’ Retirement Fund.52
Assumed rate of return # of states with rate States
7.25% 2 NC, SC
7.50% 7 GA, IN, IA, KY, TN, VA, WV
7.75% 7 CA, FL, ID, ME, MD, SD, UT
7.80% 1 WI
8.00% 22 AL, AZ, AR, DE, HI, KS, MI, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NM, NY, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, TX, WA, WY
8.25% 6 AK, LA, MA, NJ, RI, VT
8.50% 5 CO, CT, IL, MN, NH
Source: Pew Center on the States.
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Conclusion
0e .nancial crisis facing states and municipalities has been brewing for quite some time. For many years, 
governments entered binding agreements for long-term obligations without giving adequate consideration to 
the potential di2culty of making payments. Many assumed ever-increasing investment returns would match the 
obligations inherent in popular programs. A discount rate based on overly optimistic return scenarios dramatically 
understated the gaps in funding status. Deferred payments allowed the presumption that there would always be 
time to catch up on funding in the future. 
But the events of the last two years dashed those rosy assumptions and created two sets of problems for state and 
local governments: 0e recession slashed operating revenues just as it increased demand for expenditures, and the 
lack of increasing investment income exposed the impossibility of governments’ meeting their pension and health-
care obligations.
During the Financial Innovations Lab, experts explored some (though certainly not all) of the underlying challenges 
and potential market-based solutions. 0ere were no silver bullets or clever .nancial mechanisms to save the day. 
Instead, the group focused on back-to-basics approaches: regulatory and public policy initiatives such as long-term 
planning, realistic investment and actuarial assumptions, rainy-day funds, more e2cient and competitive operations, 
transparency, shared services and shared sacri.ce, and an updated model of generating increased revenue. 
Beyond these speci.c ideas for closing the gap, the Lab participants also acknowledged the importance of a 
human dynamic—that is, political will. Many of the decisions impacting state and municipal .nances are made 
by individuals who feel bound by the expectations of their constituents. Short-term re-election concerns may 
outweigh long-term considerations for sustainability and 
prudence. If the structural de.cits of the state and municipal 
system are to be addressed, public o2cials will have to 
avoid the temptation to adopt quick .xes and instead make 
fundamental decisions about spending and revenue priorities. 
If .nancial conditions continue to deteriorate in individual 
states and municipalities, pre-emptive burden-sharing 
arrangements ought to emerge as a practical resolution that  
can be taken well before things reach an ultimate breaking 
point. Hopefully the nation won’t have to experience a cascade 
of crises before responsible government o2cials .nd the 
political courage to make di2cult choices. Our overall quality 
of life—from schools, parks, roads, and transit to a safety net 
for the most vulnerable citizens—depends on this happening 
sooner rather than later. 
Michael Genest (le!) of Genest Consulting 
makes a point while Bradley Belt of Palisades 
Capital Management listens intently.
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